Re: [xwiki-devs] [Discussion] Replacing the use of PR checks. Is it really an option? How exactly?

Hi devs, We are all waiting for signed scripts to come to the rescue, but until then, we have pretty much agreed that it is a good idea to remove PR checks, which don`t work in subwikis (see activity stream [1], wikis module [2], etc.) However, once we do that, we open up a big security problem, such as "trap pages". These are basically documents containing malicious usage of our services, that are written by regular users and that are waiting (or tricking) for admins (or users with privileges) to access them by mistake. Since those script services will be looking only at the current user's rights, they will be executing the malicious code and the security will be compromised. What options do we have here? On some modules (like the wiki module) it might be useful to check the context security document (sdoc) and see if its author is an admin (of the wiki descriptor that is being saved) or a global admin, thus replacing a PR check on the current document with an "admin check on the current document". Using sdoc instead of just doc avoids attempts of using proxy documents (e.g. default ones like /bin/view/someDocument?sheet=SomeBadDocument or custom ones created by the usage of the display or include macros), but unfortunately that is not set by default by XWiki's actions and is only available in a handful of locations, meaning we can not rely on sdoc. A mechanism similar to CSRF protection API but for script services to confirm that the user really intended to execute them might be another idea, but I`m not sure how that might be implemented without allowing easy bypass by directly providing the challenge result. CAPTCHA for sensitive script services? :) That might be too extreme and completely ruin the UX. Any ideas? Thanks, Eduard ---------- [1] http://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-10446 [2] http://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-11416