On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 3:19 AM, Sergiu Dumitriu <sergiu(a)xwiki.com> wrote:
Pascal Voitot wrote:
see below
On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 8:44 AM, Jerome Velociter <jerome(a)xwiki.com>
wrote:
Sergiu pointed to me this had already been
discussed in this thread :
http://markmail.org/message/nirue2ug5ahbsy5b
I agree the security concerns are not very simple to deal with if we
want to do this.
I'm currently thinking about this...
XSS is really ennoying :)...
but we fear about the JSX extension but is there any security against JS
injection in any Wiki page ?
At least, JSX could be used as a kind of firewall...
imagine we create some JSX configuration parameters such as "Allowed JSX
external URLs"... (this is just an idea :) )...
Then when you call $jsx.use(externalurl), it is rendered by the JSX
extension which would verify the URL is allowed and if not would generate
an
error...
Yes, we should forbid <script> tags inside the content, and only allow
jsx calls.
Last night, I was looking at the US elections asking myself how to make
scripting more secure... It' s true: people are dangerous, they hate me and
want to destroy my XWiki all the time. Conclusion: I must protect myself
from everyone...
While looking at the US elections, the US republicans inspired me The
solution: an XWIKI BIG NUCLEAR SOFTWARE MASSDESTRUCTION WEAPON to nuke all
users in one click if they bother me!!!!!!!! Yes, I will never give up
against any terrorist!!!!!!!! I had even found a name for this new
extension: XWiKill'emAll
And finally, I fell asleep and I had a dreaaaaaaaaaaaaam that
onnnnnnnnnnnnnnnne dayyyyy...
And this morning, I wake up and I wonder if I'm still dreaming ;)
Anyway, on this morning, I feel a bit less extremist about security: people
might not be so evil and they don't hate me either... Maybe I don't need
this XWiKill'emAll... just need to find big security holes that would
attract the real evil guys and solve them... will be enough!
That's why, I think I will just wander a bit around the scripting security
issue to see if I don't find any other holes ;)...
historical regards
Pascal
> Jerome.
>
> Jerome Velociter wrote:
>> I'm now thinking about another possibility : letting the actual
>> extensions (documents with JavaScriptExtensions objects) letting
declare
>> their libraries dependencies. We could
create a new class for this,
>> which would have the path (absolute in case the file is distant, or
name
>> of the file if it's on the FS) as a
property. This way an extension can
>> declare as many deps as it needs.
>>
>> This is not necessary incompatible with the proposition below, we could
>> have both.
>>
>> Jerome.
>>
>> Jerome Velociter wrote:
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> Following the open question #1 here
>>>
http://dev.xwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Design/SkinExtensions#HUsage
>>>
>>> "
>>> Open question 1: Should $jsx.useFile("filename.js") work for files
>>> located on the disk? This allows the same pull process to be used with
>>> files located in the skin, without requiring SX documents and objects.
>>> I'd say yes. Then, what should the URL look like?
>>> /xwiki/bin/jsx/skins/albatross/somestyle.css is OK?
>>> "
>>>
>>> I would like to propose to go even further, and to allow injection of
>>> script tags referring libraries on the cloud or on a different server
>>> using the jsx plugin. This would allow to not have users writing
scripts
>>> tags in the body of the document to
add a library.
>>>
>>> I would see something like :
>>>
>>>
$jsx.use("http://maps.google.com/maps?file=api&v=2&key=XXX")
>>>
>>> or
>>>
>>>
$jsx.useFile("http://maps.google.com/maps?file=api&v=2&key=XXX")
>>>
>>> What do you think ?
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Jerome.
--
Sergiu Dumitriu
http://purl.org/net/sergiu/
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