Denis Gervalle wrote:
On Tue, Mar 16, 2010 at 03:46, Caleb James
DeLisle <calebdelisle(a)lavabit.com
wrote:
Right now a script which is saved with
programming access is allowed to do
things which
the viewer (who executes it) is not allowed to do. I would like to extend
this to scripts which do not
have programming access.
Use case example:
A page where the viewer can submit an email address to be put on a mailing
list. The page needs to be able to
save the email address to a list but the viewer should not be able to
directly edit (or view) the list.
I would like to add to xwiki.api.Context:
void setScriptUser(String)
String getScriptUser()
(These names are the best I could think of, suggestions would be great)
the input can be either "viewer", "author" or "default" and
it stores this
in the XWikiContext
If the value is set to author, hasAccessLevel will return an access check
on the author, not the viewer.
When includeForm is called, or the include macro is invoked, the only
explicit change is that changes made by
the called document will be reset when the include ends.
If scrips are set to run with author's permissions:
If DocumentA includes documentB, documentB executes with documentB's
author's permissions.
If DocumentA includes _in context_ documentB, documentB executes with
documentA's author's permissions.
When include of documentB ends, scriptUser is set back to the value which
documentA left it at.
I think this will help us achieve the goal of no documents with programming
rights in the XE xar file.
WDYT?
Caleb
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First of all, I am personally against adding anything to the RightService in
its current state. This is already spaghetti code which already lead to some
security risks, and trying to improve that partly could be an impossible
challenge. Moreover, this code is absolutely not optimized, you just have to
put it under debug logging to understand what I mean.
+1 I read it and I know
exactly what you mean, I *think* a rights check could be done
in one query.
I was only talking about modifying api.Context and api.Api I have no desire to touch
user.impl.xwiki.ANYTHING!
Regarding the way you expect the inclusion of documents to function, I am
not convince that this is the right choice. The behavior of inclusion has
been broken since Syntax 2.0 has been introduced, and I have always feel
this to be a serious regression. My principal use case is a document (that
could have been created by a user) editable by a user, and that store
objects in itself, and use an inclusion in context for its content. In this
case, the user may save the document, which should therefore be without any
special rights, but the code may need to have higher privileges, and still
require to be included in context for access to the including documents.
This is the typical Sheet case shown in many sample of XWiki Programming,
but with programming right requirement. I have used that many times before
it became broken, and this design is still missing to me.
You bring up an
important point which I think is worthy of it's own email. I have thought
it would be nice to allow PR code to extend the api or to add velocity macros
which will run with programming right.
I am convince that the rights given to a block of code should be tightly
linked to the content author
I hereby ammend my proposal to include contentAuthor
as a possibility for the set method, I had
forgotten about it.
of its containing document, and absolutely not
based on any author in the context in which it is executed.
Do you mean the
viewer? I believe code should never be executed in context of it's viewer
because code may set a trap which saves itself when the viewer has greater privileges
than the
code. I propose the set method because I am -1 to changing default behavior.
This has been
broken in Syntax 2.0, and this currently leads to elevation of privilege
through inclusions. For the same reason, I do not follow Alex on the idea
that the right should be set in place of a user. This would lead to many
problem in regards of who and how this could be set, stored and inherited.
I completely agree that the programming right is currently not perfect, but
in the same time, I do not see the real value you expect to provide. There
is already a similar mechanism in place, using the content author, opposed
to the last author of a page.
I want to extend that same mechanism to authors who
do not have programming rights,
PR is dangerous and should be used as little as possible and if we need it in the
default
xar that is an API flaw IMO.
This is what make commenting page possible
without breaking its programming behavior. Extending this to manage other
objects in my use case above, is probably a good track to follow. But again,
this should be part of a global reengineering of the RightService.
If you want to rethink the RightService starting from scratch, I will surely
participate ! I have already some ideas, but not been able to put them
properly in a document. Time is always missing, but I hope this to change...
I
absolutely do want to rethink the RightService, however I think it is held up by the fact
that components have no access to the HttpServletRequest.
Just answering this last point. This is not quite true. Components do have access to the
Container component which represents the environment. However, I don't think it's
good that the authentication service relies on it. What do you need exactly from the
request? You should expose that need in the Execution Context.
For example imagine that you need some unique id representing the session. If so, then
this could be stored in the EC directly or through a more coarsed-grained object.
This would allow the authentication service to work in different environments: servlet,
portlet, deamon threads, etc.
The other option (maybe even better) is to authenticate the user at the level of the
environment, i.e. in Container implementations. And the output of the environment level
would be to have a User object put in the Execution Context. I feel this second option is
even better than the first since it works without introducing an additional variable in
the EC and after all the authentication is related to the environment to some degree.
WDYT?
Thanks
-Vincent