24 Jan
2011
24 Jan
'11
12:14 a.m.
On 01/19/2011 08:04 PM, Jerome Velociter wrote:
Hi developers,
I've setup and worked on a couple of wiki farms recently, and my feedback is
that the PR issue has become for me a major PITA.
It's worst than before, because we've introduced a lot of pages that
requires it : annotations style and script, plus the wiki macros for
activity, tag cloud, space, etc. (OK, it's not really PR, it's edit right of
the last person who did edit it, but it's the same issue mostly : you need
to have it saved by someone with sufficient rights).
Importing not as back-up (meaning all pages imported from the XAR are saved
by the user doing the import) is not sufficient answer, for several reason :
* User might not have programming rights
* When user has programming rights, it's a BAD practice in terms of security
(it means every page of the wiki initially has the PR right OK)
* Wiki creation is also done by template wiki copy, which is not covered by
this
* This problem is not just an import/creation problem, we need generally a
way to know which pages require PR, and which are missing this PR (users can
be deleted, their rights can change, etc.).
OK, that looks like sufficient complaining :)
Here what I propose, tell me what you think :
1. We define a XWiki class, like XWiki.RequiredRightClass, with a field that
describe the required right the user saving the document must have for it to
behave properly (for example it will be "edit" for wiki macros with a
"wiki"
scope, and "programming" for pages that uses privileged APIs, or JSR
scripts, or always use SSX, etc.)
2. We make a simple UI (for example in the administration section of the
admin app) that list all of them, and their current status. Plus a button to
fix the status if there is something to fix (a missing PR for example) and
if the user seeing the page has the required rights of course.
+1 as a quick fix.
That's what I propose for now.
In the future, we could imagine that :
3. Programming right can only be granted on a page that requires
it explicitly. This would be a non-backward compatible change.
In the future this will be done with signed scripts. The work is halfway
done, with the xwiki-crypto module in place. That way you'd be sure only
trusted scripts are executable.
Let me know what you think.
If we agree I volunteer to implement this in 3.0 M2.
--
Sergiu Dumitriu
http://purl.org/net/sergiu/